The fundamental and contingent historical conditions of the theory of shareholder value maximization
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Abstract
The objective of this article is to unveil the essential and contingent conditions of the “theory of shareholder value maximization” (TSVM) (or shareholder primacy). This theory proclaims that the main objective of a large corporation is to generate economic returns for its shareholders. This theory has been widely disseminated since the nineteenth century, influencing the way corporations are managed. Criticism of the theory suggests that this influence is problematic because it leads large companies to short-term decisions that shrink public, social and environmental issues, threatening the existence of capitalism itself. The origin of this theory is controversial, and this theme is a condition for a better understanding of its historical content and development. Based on materialism, the paper argues that it is not possible to correctly understand a social form of consciousness without apprehending its genesis. Thus, the paper proceeds to an analysis of the genesis of the TSVM, seeking to establish both the foundations of its constitution based on the unity between finance and production in the capitalist economy and the contingent factors, such as crises and public debate, that affected the very development of this theory.
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